From 2005 up until the end of the JPA's first phase in July 2014, the US sought to exploit Iran's economically interdependent foreign ties in order to eradicate the perceived Iranian nuclear threat. This paper analyzes the developments that took place in this timeframe to assess and establish the effectiveness of this economic policy to achieve its security aim. By positing the argument in the economic interdependence-security literature, this paper contributes to the debate and policy concerned with this political economy approach, and highlights the importance of economic and political interests when considering this relationship. By using the US-Iran case study, this paper emphasizes that unilateral actions to economically isolate a state are becoming increasingly impotent. Therefore, for such an economic isolation policy to work, it must be adopted on a multilateral if not universal level.
This has been a multi-disciplinary endeavor, including; historical Economic, International Relations and Peace Theory disciplines. However, this paper is focused on the cross-disciplinary literature concerned with economic interdependence and security, which is rooted in these aforementioned disciplines. 10 One of the first recorded benefits of trade between two actors was at around 100 AD when the Greek Philosopher, Plutarch noted that sea trade can "bring about cooperation and friendship." Plutarch. C. 100 AD. Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) transaction sanctions, 66 and in December of the same year the EU adopted its most stringent sanctions up until that point, targeting: "several export bans, including on graphite, metals, key naval equipment and technology for ship-building, additional key equipment or technology for the Iranian oil, natural gas and petrochemical sector and software for industrial production." 67 A note worth considering at this point is that the European and US sanctions did not include electricity exports from Iran, allowing the IRI to export its natural gas reserves. 68 This also meant that Iran was able to maintain trade levels, in spite of these sanctions, with total
Iranian trade with the US averaging at $284.13 million from 2012 to 2013. (implemented under Bush, mentioned earlier) and EO 13599 (under Obama). This was the case, as the JPA did not require the US to amend these three particular EOs.
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The implementation of the JPA demonstrated a move to ease economic sanctions on Iran. Furthermore, the US has the opportunity (as a consequence of the JPA and succeeding JCPOA), to regain its role as an Iranian ally. This result might have a negative impact on regional actors/influencers (such as the EU). However, the resultant downgrading (or even elimination) of Iran as a security threat would reap benefits for both Tehran and the international system (in the sense that the international security threat posed by Iran's nuclear program would be removed).
In sum, the US targeting of Iran's economic-interdependent foreign ties were effective when the Whitehouse had multilateral support from external partners. In the sense that Iran and the P5+1 ultimately entered into negotiations and agreed on the interim JPA. As a result, the policy of sanctioning Iran (or in this case, the threat of sanctioning Iran should it fail to meet the JPA and subsequent JCPOA conditions), to achieve the security goal of halting the IRI's nuclear development program, required the cooperation of more than just the policy instigator, i.e. the US. Therefore, in order for the policy to be successful, it must take into account the increasingly interconnected/interdependent nature of international relations. The fact that the international system is woven between political and economic spheres means that this is increasingly becoming the case. As a result, a policy such as that adopted by the US towards Iran between 2005 and 2014 will become increasingly ineffective, unless it is on a multilateral level where Tehran's alternative foreign partners adopt the same policy, or are at least aligned to it.
Indeed, for the policy, rooted in the economic-interdependence security literature, to work, it must be adopted in an absolute sense, i.e. all of Iran's economic ties being cut/sanctioned.
At that point, the economic incentive for Iran (i.e. the removal of sanctions in this case), can be used as a carrot to achieve the security aims of the US and broader international community, i.e. nuclear non-proliferation.
POST-2015 JCPOA COMMENTARY
As noted above, the thrust of this paper is concerned with the need to account for the multilateral nature of international relations when devising policies to influence states in the international system. Given the significance of the 2015 JCPOA, this section provides a short commentary of how the conclusions of this paper fared against the JCPOA agreement and provisions. It is important to note that this paper does not focus on the JCPOA, but rather the period preceding it (2005-2014). Indeed, in order to make a full assessment of the JCPOA, an article dedicated to the subject would provide a starting point for such analyses, something which is undoubtedly being carried out at present. Therefore, it is necessary to reiterate that this section is focused on a commentary of how this paper's conclusions measure up to the 2015 JCPOA, a post-JCPOA commentary if you will.
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The JCPOA was agreed upon on July 15, 2015, and under UN Resolution 2231 (in 2015) the agreement will be adopted (i.e. the Adoption Date) 90 days following this UNSC approval. 78 As per the agreement, Iran's nuclear program is to be "exclusively peaceful [and in return, the JCPOA] … will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UNSC sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance and energy." 79 The key here being the multilateral nature of the agreement, emphasized in the quote.
The significance of this is twofold. Firstly, from the P5+1 perspective, the multilateral aspect ensures that Iran's economic interdependency on foreign states is aligned, i.e. the economic interdependence-security policy is being adopted in a manner which follows the conclusions pointed out in the main body of this paper. Therefore, from the IRI's perspective, the risk associated with reneging against the JCPOA conditions is significantly higher, as the subsequent reimplementation of sanctions would incur higher costs, due to their multilateral nature. Secondly, as evidenced by the examples and analyses in the main body of this paper, varying P5+1 positions (and indeed other state positions) led to a slow negotiation process.
Further, whilst any sense of disagreement between the P5+1 during the JCPOA negotiations has not been particularly forthcoming at this point, and understandably so, there were signs of how the multipolar nature of the negotiations elongated the process. For example, during the second round of talks following the July 2014 JPA extension, Russian Deputy Foreign
Minister, Sergei Ryabkov noted how there were "a series of subjects that cannot be categorized as completely agreed, let alone, committed to paper," in October 2014. 80 Then, following the second extension of the JPA in January 2015, France's negotiator Nicolas de la
Riviere noted that "the mood was very good, but I don't think we made a lot of progress." 81 These examples point to not only the necessity for an agreement on a P5+1-Iran level but also on a P5+1 front. important an economic isolation policy must be adopted on a multilateral level if it is to achieve its security goal(s).
